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Constitutional Cases 2007:
An Overview
Patrick J. Monahan and James Gotowiec*

I. INTRODUCTION
This volume of the Supreme Court Law Review, which consists of
papers presented at Osgoode Hall Law School’s 11th Annual Constitutional
Cases Conference held on April 18, 2008, examines the constitutional
decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada released in the calendar year
2007.1 The Court handed down just 58 judgments in 2007,2 the lowest
number since the Court’s “modern era” began in 1975.3 Before 2007, the
McLachlin Court heard an average of 82 appeals per year, while the
Lamer Court heard an average of 111 appeals every year. Constitutional
cases made up 28 per cent of the Court’s docket in 2007 (16 of the 58
decisions), which is consistent with recent trends. The majority of the
constitutional cases (12 of 16 cases) were Canadian Charter of Rights
and Freedoms cases,4 while the remaining four cases dealt with
*
Patrick J. Monahan is a Professor of Law and Dean of Osgoode Hall Law School of
York University. James Gotowiec, B.A. & Sc., is a Member of the LL.B. class of 2011, Osgoode
Hall Law School, and the J.D. class of 2011, New York University School of Law.
1
A case is defined as a “constitutional case” if the decision of the Court involves the
interpretation or application of a provision of the “Constitution of Canada”, as defined in s. 52 of the
Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11.
2
Supreme Court of Canada, Bulletin of Proceedings: Special Edition, Statistics 19972007, available online at <http://www.scc-csc.gc.ca/information/statistics/index_e.asp> [hereinafter
“Statistics”].
3
The Supreme Court of Canada gained significant control over its docket in 1975 through
amendments requiring the Court to grant leave to appeal for most civil cases.
4
Baier v. Alberta, [2007] S.C.J. No. 31, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 673 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter
“Baier”]; British Columbia (Attorney General) v. Christie, [2007] S.C.J. No. 21, [2007] 1 S.C.R.
873 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Christie”]; Canada (Attorney General) v. Hislop, [2007] S.C.J. No. 10,
[2007] 1 S.C.R. 429 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Hislop”]; Canada (Attorney General) v. JTI-Macdonald
Corp., [2007] S.C.J. No. 30, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 610 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “JTI-Macdonald”];
Charkaoui v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), [2007] S.C.J. No. 9, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 350
(S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Charkaoui”]; Health Services and Support-Facilities Subsector Bargaining
Assn. v. British Columbia, [2007] S.C.J. No. 27, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 391 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “B.C.
Health Services”]; Little Sisters Book and Art Emporium v. Canada (Commissioner of Customs and
Revenue), [2007] S.C.J. No. 2, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 38 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Little Sisters No. 2”];
Named Person v. Vancouver Sun, [2007] S.C.J. No. 43, [2007] 3 S.C.R. 253 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter
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federalism issues.5 No cases during calendar 2007 addressed Aboriginal
constitutional issues.6
The 2007 term revealed a Court that was more divided and took
more time to release lengthier decisions. Just 63 per cent of judgments
were unanimous in 2007, the lowest since the mid-1990s and a departure
from the McLachlin Court’s overall average of 75 per cent. A greater
number of dissents together with multiple concurring reasons led to
longer judgments — an average of 44.8 pages per appeal, the highest in
the past 20 years. The time from hearing a case to releasing a decision
also increased to an average of 6.6 months, compared to a mean of 5.3
months since 2000.

II. CHARTER CASES
The Court was not particularly receptive to Charter claims in 2007,
with only three of 12 cases (25 per cent) succeeding.7 This is somewhat
of a decline from the average success rate in the recent past; since
McLachlin J. was elevated to Chief Justice on January 7, 2000, Charter
claimants have succeeded in 50 out of 114 cases (44 per cent) at the
Supreme Court. However, the results from 2007 are not a significant
departure from longer-term trends, as approximately one out of every
three Charter claims has been successful at the Supreme Court over the
past two decades.8
While the number of successful Charter cases in 2007 was low, the
three cases in which the claimants did succeed (Charkaoui, B.C. Health
“Named Person”]; R. v. Bryan, [2007] S.C.J. No. 12, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 527 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter
“Bryan”]; R. v. Clayton, [2007] S.C.J. No. 32, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 725 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Clayton”];
R. v. Hape, [2007] S.C.J. No. 26, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 292 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Hape”]; R. v. Singh,
[2007] S.C.J. No. 48, [2007] 3 S.C.R. 405 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Singh”]; Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act
1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”].
5
British Columbia (Attorney General) v. Lafarge Canada Inc., [2007] S.C.J. No. 23,
[2007] 2 S.C.R. 86 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Lafarge”]; Canadian Western Bank v. Alberta, [2007]
S.C.J. No. 22, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 3 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Canadian Western Bank”]; Dunne v. Quebec
(Deputy Minister of Revenue), [2007] S.C.J. No. 19, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 853 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter
“Dunne”]; Kingstreet Investments Ltd. v. New Brunswick (Finance), [2007] S.C.J. No. 1, [2007] 1
S.C.R. 3 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Kingstreet”].
6
While the Court did release decisions dealing with Aboriginal rights issues in 2007, none
of them addressed the interpretation or application of a provision of the Constitution of Canada.
7
A Charter claim is treated as being successful when the claimant receives some form of
relief under s. 24 of the Charter, or where a statute or other legal rule is declared to be inconsistent
with the Constitution of Canada under s. 52 of the Constitution Act, 1982.
8
See Patrick J. Monahan & Evan Van Dyk, “Constitutional Cases 2004: An Overview”
(2005) 29 S.C.L.R. (2d) 1, at 2.
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Services and Hislop) set what may prove to be important precedents. In
particular, the Hislop case develops a new framework for determining
whether Charter remedies should be granted on a retroactive basis, a
framework that will likely prove difficult to apply and may generate
uncertainty for both claimants and governments. (Both Charkaoui,
dealing with the constitutional validity of the Immigration and Refugee
Protection Act security certificate regime, and B.C. Health Services, in
which the Court ruled that Canadians have a constitutional right to
engage in collective bargaining, are addressed in detail elsewhere in this
volume and, accordingly, will not be dealt with here.)
Equally important were the 2007 cases in which Charter claims were
unsuccessful. There were a total of five appeals dealing with freedom of
expression claims under section 2(b), as well as two significant cases
dealing with police powers. Another important theme that emerges from
the 2007 term is an evident concern on the part of the majority of the
Court with the potential cost implications flowing from the recognition
of Charter claims. These developments are explored in some detail below.
1. Charter Remedies — Canada (Attorney General) v. Hislop
Hislop arose from a class action lawsuit challenging the federal
government’s July 2000 amendments to the Canada Pension Plan
(“CPP”)9 as a violation of section 15(1) of the Charter. The amending
legislation, the Modernization of Benefits and Obligations Act
(“MBOA”),10 had been enacted in response to the Supreme Court’s
ruling in M. v. H.11 striking down the opposite sex definition of “spouse”
in Ontario’s Family Law Act. The MBOA made same-sex partners
eligible for survivor’s benefits under the Plan; however, it also added
two new subsections that restricted the date on which same-sex survivors
became entitled to benefits. Section 44(1.1) limited CPP eligibility to
same-sex survivors whose contributing partner had died after January 1,
1998, while section 72(2) allowed no payments to same-sex survivors
for any month before July 2000 (when same-sex survivors first became
eligible under the CPP to apply for survivor’s benefits).
9

R.S.C. 1985, c. C-8.
S.C. 2000, c. 12. The MBOA was an omnibus statute that amended 68 pieces of federal
legislation to comply with the Court’s ruling in M. v. H., infra, note 11.
11
[1999] S.C.J. No. 23, [1999] 2 S.C.R. 3 (S.C.C.), holding that the exclusion of same-sex
couples from the definition of common law spouse under Ontario’s Family Law Act, R.S.O. 1990,
c. F.3 violated s. 15 and could not be justified under s. 1.
10
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A class action was brought by a group of same-sex survivors (the
“Hislop class”) challenging sections 44(1.1) and 72(2) of the CPP as a
violation of their equality rights. The class made two other constitutional
claims. They asserted that the application of the general rule of section
72(1), which restricts all retroactive benefit claims (from both same-sex
and opposite-sex survivors) to 12 months from the date of application
had an adverse effect on same-sex survivors as they had been unable to
apply for benefits before July 2000. They also challenged the application
of section 60(2), which required the estates of survivors of same-sex
relationships to submit claims to benefits within 12 months of the death
of the survivor.
The Court ruled 7-0 that the limitations prescribed by sections
44(1.1) and 72(2) of the CPP violated section 15(1) of the Charter and
could not be upheld under section 1. Its reasoning on these issues was
fairly straightforward and did not break any significant new ground.
With respect to the limitation in section 44(1.1) (which provided that
only those claimants whose contributing partners had died after January
1, 1998 were eligible for benefits), the only difficult legal issue was the
correct choice of comparator group. The Attorney General of Canada
had argued that the legislation did not distinguish between same-sex and
opposite-sex couples but, rather, between two groups of same-sex
couples: those where the contributing partner died prior to, as opposed to
later than, January 1, 1998. The Supreme Court rightly rejected this
argument, holding that what must be compared is the subset of same-sex
survivors who remain excluded from CPP survivors’ benefits, along with
similarly situated opposite-sex survivors. This meant that the appropriate
comparator group consisted of opposite-sex survivors whose contributing
partner had died prior to January 1998. Having made this determination,
the Court concluded that excluding same-sex survivors whose partners
had died prior to January 1998 from applying for CPP benefits violated
the Court’s established tests under section 15 and could not be justified
under section 1.
With respect to section 72(2), which precluded claims for same-sex
benefits for periods prior to July 2000, the Court noted that there were
general provisions elsewhere in the legislation limiting claims for
retroactive benefits to 12 months from the date of application. This
general limitation provided an answer to concerns about the potential
costs associated with claims for same-sex survivors’ benefits reaching
extensively into the past. The Court therefore was unable to discern a
compelling justification for precluding entirely any benefits claims for
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periods prior to July 2000. The effect of eliminating section 72(2) was
that it would be possible for same-sex survivors to claim pension arrears
from as early as August 1999 (i.e., 12 months prior to the coming into
force of the MBOA.)
The real significance of Hislop came in its analysis of section 72(1),
the general provision limiting claims for retroactive CPP benefits to a
maximum of 12 months. The claimants were not seeking a declaration
that this provision was invalid in its entirety. Rather, they sought a
constitutional exemption from the limitation on arrears, so that same-sex
survivors would be able to claim arrears for the period between 1985 and
2000.
The majority reasons of LeBel and Rothstein JJ. (concurred in by
four others), noted that declarations of invalidity often have retroactive
effect. This is because an invalid law is generally invalid from the outset,
meaning that any prior government actions or decisions taken on the
basis of such a law will also be invalid. This is a straightforward
application of principles associated with the rule of law, which holds that
government actions require proper legal authorization to have binding
effect.
So far so good. But the majority opinion of LeBel and Rothstein JJ.
moves on to more questionable ground by suggesting that the retroactive
effect of a constitutional declaration of invalidity arises from the 18thcentury writings of jurist William Blackstone, rather than principles
associated with the rule of law. According to LeBel and Rothstein JJ.,
constitutional remedies have retroactive effect because of Blackstone’s
“declaratory approach”, which holds that judges do not create law but
merely discover it. Because judges merely “rediscover rules which are
deemed to have always existed”12 it is appropriate to grant retroactive
effect to declarations of invalidity. This leads the majority opinion to the
further conclusion that, where courts operate “outside of the Blackstonian
paradigm” (when “judges are fashioning new legal rules or principles
and not when they are applying existing law”),13 then it may be
appropriate for the court to issue a prospective rather than a retroactive
remedy.
The difficulty with this remedial framework is that it depends on a
questionable distinction between cases in which courts are merely
“discovering” law, as opposed to those in which courts are creating new
12
13

Hislop, supra, note 4, at para. 84, per LeBel and Rothstein JJ.
Id., at para. 86.
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law. Virtually all cases that reach the Supreme Court of Canada involve
some significant creative legal element. Thus it would appear extremely
difficult and problematic to distinguish between cases in which courts
are merely “declaring the law as it existed” as opposed to those in which
it is “developing new law”. The majority opinion seems to acknowledge
this difficulty, by suggesting that prospective (as opposed to retroactive)
remedies will be appropriate in cases involving a “substantial change in
the law”.14 Moreover, even where there has been a “substantial change in
the law”, LeBel and Rothstein JJ. suggest that it is necessary to take into
account a range of other contextual factors and considerations, including
whether there has been reasonable or good faith reliance by government,
fairness to litigants and whether a retroactive remedy would unduly
interfere with the allocation of scarce public resources by governments.15
However, in cases involving the collection of taxes based on
unconstitutional statutes, the funds must be returned retroactively,
regardless of whether there has been a substantial change in the law.16
In Hislop, the majority held that while the “substantial change in the
law” test was met, the contextual factors weighed against a retroactive
remedy. The majority viewed the Hislop class’s arguments as a claim for
compensatory damages flowing from the underinclusiveness of the CPP
and, in the absence of bad faith, unreasonable reliance by government, or
conduct that was clearly wrong, such a remedy was inappropriate. Given
that the remedy the class was seeking was unavailable, LeBel and
Rothstein JJ. found it unnecessary to consider the constitutionality of
section 72(1).
The concurring opinion of Bastarache J. reaches the same result but
by a much more direct and simple route. Justice Bastarache points out
that the basis for the general retroactivity of constitutional remedies is
not the Blackstonian declaratory theory but the Constitution itself: any
law that is inconsistent with the Constitution of Canada is invalid from
the outset, and government decisions taken in reliance on invalid
legislation have no legal foundation. However, Bastarache J. goes on to
suggest that there may be cases where countervailing considerations
argue against the normal rule that constitutional remedies operate
retrospectively as well as prospectively. This was precisely such a case,
since the effect of ordering the payment of CPP benefits retroactively to
14
15
16

Id., at para. 99.
Id., at para. 100.
Id., at para. 108.
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1985, with interest, would have involved significant disruption to public
finances while conferring a huge windfall on a limited number of
beneficiaries. In the result, Bastarache J. agreed with the majority that
the remedy should be prospective only in this case.
The majority opinion of LeBel and Rothstein JJ., holding that the
courts do commonly make substantial changes in the law, is an
unusually candid acknowledgement of the creative role of courts in
Charter adjudication. Unfortunately, it appears to have complicated,
rather than simplified, the issue of when retroactive Charter relief is
appropriate. The “substantial change in the law” test will likely prove to
be difficult to apply in practice, and will likely result in more litigation
to establish exactly what qualifies as a significant change in the law.
Justice Bastarache’s analysis demonstrates that it is possible to arrive at
the same result, using substantially the same criteria as the majority,
without engaging in an inquiry of whether a recent legal decision has
involved a “significant” break with the past. It remains to be seen
whether the remedial framework articulated by the majority in Hislop is
widely applied in future cases.
2. Freedom of Expression
The Court heard five cases related to section 2(b) freedom of
expression claims in 2007, all of which were unsuccessful.17 The Court’s
established approach to freedom of expression claims is to give a broad
definition to the right, and to consider any limitations on free expression
through balancing under section 1. The 2007 section 2(b) decisions
revealed a slight departure from that approach, and a greater willingness
to dispose of free expression claims on the basis of a categorical test
rather than balancing.

17

Baier, supra, note 4: an Alberta law requiring teachers running for school board trustee
positions to take a leave of absence does not violate s. 2(b); JTI-Macdonald, supra, note 4: the
government’s restrictions on tobacco advertising, contained in the Tobacco Act, S.C. 1997, c. 13 and
Tobacco Products Information Regulations, SOR/2000-272 violated s. 2(b) but were saved under s.
1; Little Sisters No. 2, supra, note 4: advanced cost awards for continuing litigation will be granted
only in rare and exceptional circumstances, where the case is sufficiently important that denying the
application would be “contrary to the interests of justice”; Named Person, supra, note 4: the right
that police informers have to protection of their identities in court trumps free expression claims;
Bryan, supra, note 4: sections of the Canada Elections Act, S.C. 2000, c. 9 prohibiting the
transmission of election results from one riding into a riding with open polling stations are
constitutional.
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For example in Named Person, during an in camera portion of an
extradition hearing the person who was the subject of the proceeding
notified the judge that he was a confidential police informer. The court
appointed an amicus curiae and heard submissions as to whether the
extradition proceedings should continue in camera. The court eventually
invited a number of media representatives to make submissions as to
whether the “open court” principle, protected by section 2(b), took
precedence over the protection of the identity of police informers. Justice
Bastarache, writing for eight members of the Court, found that the
informer privilege must remain absolute, and therefore any information
that can be used to identify an informant cannot be revealed, “except
where the innocence of a criminal accused is at stake”.18 A court has no
discretion in deciding whether to apply the rule; Bastarache J. noted that
“the duty of a court not to breach the privilege is of the same nature as
the duty of the police or the Crown”.19 There was therefore no need to
balance the protection for police informers with the “open court”
principle.
Similarly, in Baier the Court considered a requirement that school
employees seeking election as school trustees take an unpaid leave of
absence in order to run for office, and resign if elected. This requirement
was challenged on the basis that it limited the employees’ claims to
expressive freedom.20 Eight members of the Court, in two separate
concurring opinions, found that there was no violation of section 2(b)
and therefore no need to consider section 1. The majority opinion of
Rothstein J. relied on the fact that the claimants were seeking a positive
rather than a negative right; in this case, they sought access to the
statutory platform of school trustee candidacy and school trusteeship.
Justice Rothstein held that this claim failed to satisfy the Dunmore
criteria as to the limited circumstances in which a positive right could
quality for Charter protection.21 Justice LeBel, on behalf of two others,
18

Named Person, supra, note 4, at para. 4.
Id., at para. 21.
20
The limitation was also challenged on the basis of a violation of s. 15(1), but this claim
was dismissed on the basis that the distinction drawn by the legislation did not involve a ground that
was “enumerated or analogous” to the grounds identified in s. 15.
21
Dunmore v. Ontario (Attorney General), [2001] S.C.J. No. 87, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 1016, at
paras. 24-26 (S.C.C.). In Dunmore the Court had held that in cases where it is alleged that a
statutory regime is underinclusive, the claim must be grounded in “fundamental Charter freedoms
rather than in access to a particular statutory regime”; the claimant must also show that exclusion
from the regime has the effect of substantial interference with an activity protected under s. 2(b);
finally, the purpose of the exclusion must not be to interfere with freedom of expression, but must
19
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held that the claim concerned a democratic right (to run for school board
trustee) that the Charter did not protect, meaning section 2(b) was
inapplicable to the case. In the rest, by an 8-1 margin, the Court did not
find it necessary to proceed to a consideration of section 1 of the
Charter. (Justice Fish dissented, arguing that excluding a group of
qualified persons from serving on democratically elected boards violated
section 2(b) and could not be justified under section 1.)
Finally, in Little Sisters No. 2, the Court by a 7-2 majority held that
orders for advance costs should be made only in “rare and exceptional”
cases. Vancouver’s Little Sisters Book and Art Emporium has fought a
series of protracted legal battles with Canada Customs over the agency’s
detention of ostensibly obscene materials at the border. Despite the
owners’ partial success before the Supreme Court in Little Sisters No. 1,22
Customs has continued to detain materials destined for the store. Little
Sisters challenged Customs’ classification of four titles as obscene in the
B.C. Supreme Court. During the litigation at the trial level, the store
owners brought an application for an advance costs award, claiming they
could not afford to continue the case. The trial judge granted the
application, and Customs appealed the order. The B.C. Court of Appeal
allowed the appeal, setting aside the costs award. Little Sisters appealed
to the Supreme Court, which dismissed the appeal.
The main majority opinion of Bastarache and LeBel JJ. noted that
public interest advance costs orders should be approached with great
caution and only granted as a last resort where their necessity is clearly
established. The concurring opinion of McLachlin C.J.C. and Charron J.
appeared to set the bar even higher, holding that an order for advance
costs should be made only in “special circumstances making this
extraordinary exercise of the court’s power appropriate”.23 The two
majority opinions narrowed the scope of the Court’s earlier holding in
Okanagan, where advance costs had been awarded to four Indian bands
involved in a logging dispute with the British Columbia government.24
The Court described Okanagan as a case where there was “an exceptional
convergence of factors” justifying an advance costs order, and emphasized
be in furtherance of some other legitimate objective. Justice Rothstein held that none of these three
criteria was satisfied in this instance.
22
Little Sisters Book and Art Emporium v. Canada (Minister of Justice), [2000] S.C.J. No.
66, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 1120 (S.C.C.).
23
Little Sisters No. 2, supra, note 4, at para. 88.
24
British Columbia (Minister of Forests) v. Okanagan Indian Band, [2003] S.C.J. No. 76,
[2003] 3 S.C.R. 371 (S.C.C.).
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that the case involved an “evolutionary step, but not a revolution, in the
exercise of the courts’ discretion regarding costs”.25
3. Other Charter Cases
The categorical approach favoured in a number of the Court’s
freedom of expression claims was evident in other cases in the 2007
term as well, notably Hape. In Hape, the RCMP had commenced an
investigation into suspected money laundering activities by a Canadian
businessman, who was later charged with money laundering. They
obtained permission from the Turks and Caicos Islands authorities to
conduct part of the investigation on the Islands, where the accused had
an investment company. During the investigation the RCMP conducted a
number of searches (some without warrants) of the accused’s offices on
the Islands.26 The accused sought to have the documentary evidence
obtained excluded on the basis that it had been obtained in violation of
his rights under section 8 of the Charter.
The Court ruled 9-0 (but with three sets of reasons) that there was no
Charter violation in this case. For a five-member majority, LeBel J.
concluded that the Charter does not apply to Canadian officials operating
in another jurisdiction, with very rare exceptions.27 Where there is an
attempt to adduce evidence at a Canadian trial obtained through a
foreign search, the court should base its decision on the need to ensure
the fairness of a trial. This requirement follows from the Charter
provisions guaranteeing trial fairness in Canada (sections 7 and 11(d))
and does not involve the extraterritorial application of the Charter. In
this case, LeBel J. concluded that the Charter did not apply to the
searches themselves; moreover, in his view admitting the evidence
obtained during the searches would not result in an unfair trial and
therefore there was no violation of section 7 or section 11(d). Justice
Bastarache, for two other justices, held that the Charter could apply
25

Little Sisters No. 2, supra, note 4, at para. 34.
While no warrants were admitted into evidence during the trial (and none had been
secured for the perimeter surveillance of Hape’s office), the RCMP officers testified that they had
relied on the expertise of the detective in charge of criminal investigations on the Islands, and had
understood that warrants had been obtained for several covert searches performed at the office. See
Hape, supra, note 4.
27
One exception would be if the foreign state consented to the application of Canadian law,
including the Charter, on its territory (id., at para. 106); a second exception would arise if the
activity by Canadian state actors would place Canada in violation of its international human rights
obligations (id., at para. 101).
26
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extraterritorially, but agreed with the disposition in this case on the basis
that Hape had not established that the search was unreasonable, in light
of the local laws which governed searches of accused premises. In
Bastarache J.’s opinion, therefore, section 8 of the Charter applied to the
searches but had not been breached. Justice Binnie wrote a brief set of
reasons concurring in the result but disassociating himself from what he
described as LeBel J.’s “[c]onstitutional pronouncements of such farreaching implications”,28 and arguing that this case did not afford “a
proper springboard for such sweeping conclusions”.29
The potential implications of Hape were made apparent just months
later in the Amnesty International Canada case, in which the Federal
Court held that the Charter did not apply to military transfers by
Canadian authorities of Afghan detainees.30 On this basis, Mactavish J.
dismissed an application for judicial review of the transfers. Yet in May
of 2008, the Supreme Court unanimously ruled in Khadr that one of the
exceptions identified in Hape applied to interrogations being conducted
by Canadian officials at the U.S. military base in Guantanamo Bay,
Cuba.31 In particular the Court relied on the fact that the process in place
at Guantanamo Bay had been found by the U.S. Supreme Court to
violate U.S. domestic law and international human rights obligations to
which Canada subscribes. Therefore the normal rule to the effect that the
Charter did not apply to activities on foreign soil was inapplicable, and
Omar Khadr was entitled to disclosure of documents in possession of the
Canadian government relevant to charges he was facing under U.S. law.
What was unusual about Khadr was that there had been a prior
ruling by the highest domestic court in the jurisdiction (here the U.S.
Supreme Court), based on a full factual record, that the activities in
question violated international law. In the absence of such a prior ruling
(which will most often be the case), to what extent will the courts require
a separate proceeding to consider the application of international human
rights law, before ruling on whether the Charter applies to activities in a
28

Id., at para. 189.
Id., at para. 182. Justice Binnie noted that the so-called “war on terror” involved
considerable activity by Canadian government or military officials on foreign soil. In his view it was
preferable to have a proper factual record and complete legal argument on whether the Charter
should apply in such circumstances.
30
Amnesty International Canada v. Canada (Canadian Forces), [2008] F.C.J. No. 356,
2008 FC 336 (F.C.). Interestingly, Binnie J. in his dissent in Hape had referenced the litigation on
this issue, and indicated that the Supreme Court should not foreclose the potential application of the
Charter to this activity. See Hape, supra, note 4, at para. 184.
31
Canada (Justice) v. Khadr, [2008] S.C.J. No. 29, 2008 SCC 29 (S.C.C.).
29
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foreign jurisdiction? If such separate proceedings are commonly entertained,
this would clearly limit the application of Hape, which seemed to create
a categorical rule against the extraterritorial application of the Charter.
The Court handed down two significant cases dealing with police
powers in 2007, both of which sided with law enforcement. The first of
these, R. v. Clayton, raised the question of whether a roadside stop and
detention violated section 8 or section 9 of the Charter. Police officers,
responding to an early-morning 911 call warning that individuals in a
number of vehicles were displaying handguns, had stopped a vehicle and
detained the occupants. The Ontario Court of Appeal had quashed the
trial convictions in the case, holding that the roadblock was unlawful
because there was no imminent danger, and the vehicle that was stopped
was not one of the vehicles that had been identified in the 911 call that
brought police to the scene. Justice Abella, for a six-member majority,
restored the convictions, finding that there was no violation of section 8
or section 9 of the Charter and, therefore, no need to consider the
application of section 24 or section 1. Justice Abella reasoned that in
assessing whether searches incident to an investigative detention violated
the Charter, it was necessary to consider whether the stop and search
were no more intrusive than reasonably necessary. In particular, searches
can be justified if an officer believes reasonably that his or her safety, or
that of others, is at risk. Here the police had reasonable grounds to
believe that there were several handguns in a public place. This
represented a serious offence accompanied by genuine risk to the public,
and justified a search of the vehicle in question even though it had not
been described in the 911 call.
The Court was more closely divided in Singh, one of only two
constitutional cases to be decided by a 5-4 majority in 2007.32 The
accused was arrested for second degree murder in respect of the shooting
death of an innocent bystander who was killed by a stray bullet while
standing just inside the doorway of a pub. Singh was advised of his right
to counsel and stated 18 times during the course of interviews that he did
not want to talk to police. Nevertheless the police continued their
questioning. Although he did not confess to the crime, he made a
number of admissions which, when taken together with other evidence,
were probative of the issue of identification. Singh challenged the
admissibility of the statements on the basis of a violation of his right to
silence under section 7. Justice Charron, writing for a five-person
32
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majority of the Court, found that there was no “rigid requirement” that
police refrain from questioning a detainee who states that he or she does
not wish to speak to police. To impose a general prohibition of this kind
would ignore the state interest in the effective investigation of crime.
Justice Charron emphasized that the fundamental question remained
whether the statement was made voluntarily. While persistence in
continuing an interview in the face of protestations from the accused that
he wished to remain silent might give rise to a “strong argument” that
the statement was not made voluntarily, the trial judge in this case found
Singh’s statement to have been made freely and there was no basis to
interfere with that finding.
Justice Fish authored a vigorous dissent on behalf of four members
of the Court, arguing that intense questioning over suspects’ protests
deprived them of their right to silence. According to the dissenters, in a
situation such as the one in which Singh found himself, where his
continued resistance to questioning appeared useless, “ultimate
submission proves neither true consent nor valid waiver”.33 Justice Fish
would have allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial.
Significantly, both Clayton and Singh arose from criminal activity
involving guns or gun crime. There is widespread public concern in
Canada over the extent of gun crime, particularly in major urban centres
such as Toronto.34 The majority opinions in both Clayton and Singh seem
particularly sensitive to the need to ensure that the application of the
Charter not unduly impede the ability of the police to investigate and
prosecute gun crime.
The justices also demonstrated a good deal of sensitivity to the cost
implications of their Charter rulings this past year. In Hislop, the Court
indicated that it would be appropriate, in determining whether to make a
Charter remedy retroactive, to consider the cost implications of such an
order. Similarly, in Christie, a lawyer challenged the constitutionality of
British Columbia’s legal service tax, arguing that the tax made it
impossible for some of his low-income clients to afford his services.
Christie argued the tax violated a constitutional right of access to justice
that was based on the principle of the rule of law. In a per curiam
33

Singh, supra, note 4, at para. 66.
See, for example, John Barber, “Urbanites’ call for ban on guns hits deaf ears in Ottawa”
The Globe and Mail, April 10, 2008, at A13 (reporting on the 16,000 residents who signed Toronto
Mayor David Miller’s Internet petition to ban handguns in only four days); Lee Greenberg, “Murder
rate growing in infamy” Leader Post, December 27, 2007, at D8 (reporting on the after-effects of
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opinion, the Court disagreed, holding there was no general right to be
represented by a lawyer in a court proceeding where legal rights or
obligations are at stake. The justices held that “the fiscal implications of
the right sought cannot be denied. … It is a huge change that would …
impose a not inconsiderable burden on taxpayers”.35

III. FEDERALISM CASES
The Court shifted its interpretation of the interjurisdictional
immunity doctrine, and clarified its approach to issues of federal
paramountcy, in a pair of important federalism cases. In both Canadian
Western Bank36 and Lafarge,37 released concurrently, the Court
significantly narrowed the interjurisdictional immunity doctrine, which
limits the extent to which laws enacted by one level of government can
affect matters falling within the exclusive jurisdiction of the other. The
leading case on the scope of the interjurisdictional immunity doctrine
had been Beetz J.’s opinion in Bell Canada (1988),38 which had held that
provincial laws could not affect “integral and vital parts” of federally
regulated undertakings, such as those in fields of interprovincial
transportation or communication. The majority opinion of Binnie and
LeBel JJ., writing for six members of the Court, held that Beetz J.’s
approach in Bell Canada (1988) gave too broad a scope to the
interjurisdictional immunity doctrine. Echoing sentiments expressed by
former Chief Justice Dickson,39 Justices Binnie and LeBel argued that
this broad application of the doctrine was counter to the “dominant tide
of constitutional interpretation” favouring the ordinary operation of
statutes enacted by both levels of government; moreover, it “runs the
risk of creating an unintentional centralizing tendency in constitutional
interpretation”.40 They proceeded to expound a more restrictive approach
35

Christie, supra, note 4, at para. 14.
Supra, note 5: Alberta amended its Insurance Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. I-3 in 2000 to apply a
licensing scheme to banks that were selling insurance in the province. A number of banks
challenged the law, arguing that according to the doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity it must be
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Supra, note 5.
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Bell Canada v. Québec (Commission de la santé et de la sécurité du travail), [1988]
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to the doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity, reverting back to the law
as it stood prior to Bell Canada (1988). First, they suggested that the
doctrine was of limited application and should generally be reserved for
situations already covered by precedent.41 In practical terms, this meant
that the doctrine would generally be applied only in respect of federal
undertakings or entities that had previously been held to fall within its
scope. In cases not covered by prior precedent, Binnie and LeBel JJ.
suggested that federal undertakings would only be immune from
provincial laws which “impair” (as opposed to merely “affect”) their
operations; in addition, only activities that were vital or essential to the
“basic, minimum and unassailable” content of the federal head of power
would be immune from provincial regulation. Applying this restrictive
doctrine to the facts in Canadian Western Bank, the majority held that
the business of selling insurance was not a vital or essential part of
banking and, therefore, banks that sold insurance as part of their business
were subject to provincial insurance regulation as well as federal
regulation under the Bank Act.42
Canadian Western Bank also provides important clarification
respecting the scope of the doctrine of federal paramountcy. As is well
known, in cases where there is an inconsistency between valid and
applicable federal and provincial laws, the provincial law is rendered
inoperative to the extent of the inconsistency. The key challenge has
been to define the circumstances in which there is a “conflict” between
federal and provincial legislation. Earlier Supreme Court jurisprudence
had tended to define situations of conflict quite narrowly, arising only in
cases of a direct contradiction between federal and provincial laws. The
classic case would be “where one enactment says ‘yes’ and the other
says ‘no’”, such that compliance with one law would involve defiance of
the other.43 A number of more recent decisions had appeared to suggest a
somewhat broader interpretation of legislative conflict, as arising where
the operation of a provincial law might “frustrate the purpose” of a
federal enactment.44 In Canadian Western Bank, the majority opinion
clarified that in these more recent cases the Court did not intend to
41
42
43

Id., at para. 77.
S.C. 1991, c. 46.
Multiple Access Ltd. v. McCutcheon, [1982] S.C.J. No. 66, [1982] 2 S.C.R. 161, at 191
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“reverse its previous decisions and adopt the ‘occupied field’ test it had
clearly rejected … ”.45 Moreover, the onus of establishing the existence
of a conflict lies on the party seeking to rely on the doctrine of federal
paramountcy. Applying this framework to the legislation before it, the
Court found that there was no incompatibility between the relevant
provisions of the Bank Act and applicable provincial insurance regulation.
A similar approach was adopted in relation to the doctrine of
interjurisdictional immunity by Binnie and LeBel JJ. in Lafarge. Lafarge
Canada Inc. wished to build a concrete production plant on port lands
owned by the Vancouver Port Authority (“VPA”), a federally regulated
undertaking constituted pursuant to the Canada Marine Act.46 VPA
approved the facility, which violated certain zoning requirements of the
City of Vancouver. The City took the position that it did not have
jurisdiction over the lands because they were subject to exclusive federal
jurisdiction, but a group of ratepayers filed suit in B.C. Supreme Court
arguing the City had incorrectly declined to exercise jurisdiction. The
ratepayers’ application was allowed, but was overturned by the B.C.
Court of Appeal. At the Supreme Court of Canada, Binnie and LeBel JJ.,
writing for the same six-member majority that decided Canadian
Western Bank, held that the lands were not immune from provincial or
municipal regulation. They relied on the fact that the lands were owned
by the VPA which, although a federal undertaking, was not a federal
Crown agent in relation to the lands in question. Moreover, the lessee of
the lands, Lafarge Inc., was not a federal undertaking and the activities
that were to take place on the land (cement mixing) did not fall within
VPA’s core or vital functions, nor were they inextricably bound up with
navigation and shipping. Thus there was no basis to invoke the doctrine
of interjurisdictional immunity and provincial land use controls could
apply.
However, Binnie and LeBel JJ. went on to conclude that there was
an operational conflict between applicable federal and provincial
regulation and therefore the provincial regulation was rendered
inoperative by virtue of the conflict. The operational conflict arose by
virtue of differing standards with respect to height restrictions and noise
and pollution standards. Therefore the City’s zoning and development

45
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by-law was constitutionally inapplicable to the project by virtue of
Parliament’s exclusive jurisdiction over “navigation and shipping”.47
Justice Bastarache concurred with his colleagues’ disposition of both
cases, but disagreed with their approach to the interjurisdictional
immunity doctrine. He defended the doctrine as “an essential legal test”
necessary in any constitutional challenge to legislation, holding that the
proper analytical pattern should always involve a consideration of the
validity, applicability and then operability of the challenged legislation.
Without the doctrine, Bastarache J. argued, there is no way for a court to
read down a provincial law that is inapplicable to a federal matter while
still preserving the applicability of the law to “non-federal” matters.

IV. VOTING PATTERNS
In 2007, the justices were only unanimous in 63 per cent of the
constitutional cases they heard. This statistic masks the fact that the
Court was significantly more divided on Charter issues (only unanimous
in six of 12 cases) than it was in federalism cases; all four federalism
decisions in 2007 were unanimous in the result. In divided Charter cases,
McLachlin C.J.C., Bastarache, Deschamps, Charron and Rothstein JJ.
tended to be in the majority. In the 12 Charter cases decided by the
Court, Bastarache, Charron and Rothstein JJ. had no dissents, while the
Chief Justice and Deschamps J. had one dissent each. Justices Binnie,
LeBel and Fish each had three dissents, while Abella J. dissented twice.
In all cases except Deschamps J.’s opinion in B.C. Health Services, the
dissent was in favour of the Charter claimant.

V. CONCLUSION — A STUDY IN CONTRASTS
The most striking feature of the 2007 term may prove to be how
much of a departure it represented from recent experience at the
Supreme Court. For example, in 2004 and 2005, the Court decided an
average of 84 appeals per year, compared to 58 in 2007. The justices
were unanimous in 73 per cent of cases in those earlier two years,
compared to 63 per cent in the past year, while the average time from

47
Canadian Western Bank, supra, note 40, at para. 59. Note that the Court held that the bylaw was inapplicable in its entirety, not just in respect of those provisions which were inconsistent
with relevant federal requirements.
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hearing an appeal to releasing a judgment has gone from 4.6 months to
6.6 months.
The equilibrium that existed as recently as two years ago appears to
have eroded somewhat. As Bastarache J. unexpectedly announced his
retirement in April 2008, his replacement could play a pivotal role in the
Court’s future jurisprudence. It will also be an interesting opportunity to
see how the Conservative government will shape the procedure for
nominating justices to the Supreme Court. On May 28, 2008, the
Minister of Justice announced the details of the process,48 which will
continue the trend towards openness and transparency begun with the
nomination of Abella and Charron JJ. and continued with that of Rothstein
J.49 Under the new process, the Minister will develop a list of qualified
candidates, through consultations with the attorneys general of the four
Atlantic provinces,50 as well as members of the legal community. The
Department of Justice has also set up a website and email address for
members of the public to provide input on potential candidates. The list
of candidates will be given to a panel composed of five Members of
Parliament — two members from the Conservative caucus, and one from
each of the opposition caucuses, selected by each party leader. The socalled Supreme Court Selection Panel will be required to assess the
candidates and provide an unranked list of three qualified candidates to
the Prime Minister and Minister of Justice. The Prime Minister and the
Minister will select from that list and the nominee will appear at a public
hearing before an ad hoc committee of Parliament, similar to the
committee Rothstein J. appeared at in 2006.51
Critics of the committee process that led to the appointment of
Rothstein J. suggested that it would lead to the politicization of the
judiciary and predicted U.S.-style confirmation battles.52 This did not
come to pass. However, Rothstein J. was selected by the Conservatives
48
An outline of the process is available at the Department of Justice website,
<http://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/scc-csc.html>.
49
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50
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from a shortlist developed under Paul Martin’s Liberal minority
government, which may have muted any potential opposition to
Rothstein J.’s appointment from the ad hoc committee or the Liberal
caucus. Moreover, the advisory committee that developed the shortlist
that led to Rothstein J.’s appointment included non-partisan members,
such as a retired judge, nominees of provincial law societies and
individuals who were neither judges nor lawyers. Provision was also
made for nominees of provincial attorneys general. Under the new
process, the panel selecting the shortlist is composed of five Members of
Parliament, two of whom are members of the governing Conservative
caucus.
Reducing the size of the advisory panel and eliminating the nonpartisan representatives and the nominees of the provincial attorneys
general appears unwise and entails the risk that the advisory panel will
operate in a partisan fashion. Such partisanship could then spill over into
the public hearing, which could taint both the nominee and the entire
nomination process. In our view, it would have been preferable to retain
the structure of the earlier advisory committee, which combined partisan
and non-partisan membership. Nevertheless, one positive element is that
the government members have a minority on the advisory panel, which
may induce the panel to operate in a consensual fashion. If a future
majority government chooses to use a similar advisory panel, it should
retain this arrangement. It is to be hoped that the government will
carefully monitor the impact of the additional changes it has introduced
in the current appointment process, and recognize that it may be
necessary to make further adjustments in the future in order to ensure
that the merit principle remains the dominant consideration in terms of
appointments to our highest court.

